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1 Contradictions of an
International Anti-Poverty Agenda
The theme of this article is that research into poverty
has to be multi-disciplinary and, perhaps more con-
troversially, that the dominant discipline should be
political science. At present, to the extent that poverty
research is multi-disciplinary the dominant discipline
is economics. We are looking at a situation in which a
small (but technically sophisticated) economics tail is
trying to wag a very large political dog. We need to
arrive at a position from which we understand much
better how the politics of national anti-poverty strate-
gies works, so that the economists of poverty can play
the role that Keynes once envisioned for them, simi-
lar to that of humble but competent dentists.
Our fundamental political assumption here will be
the following: international agendas on poverty
reduction, however sincerely espoused, can be
effective only by influencing national political agen-
das. This point has been well put by the Indian
political scientist Rajni Kothari: 'History has shown
very clearly that one cannot constructively trans-
form a society from the outside. All genuine social
transformations have been initiated from within the
society, even though in many cases the genesis for
such transformation lay in the cross-fertilisation of
ideas and experiences from different societies'
(1993, 152). The problem is to move from the
cross-fertilisation of ideas on poverty reduction to
internally driven political agendas.
But the 1990s revival in poverty studies is driven to
a very significant extent by the policies of the inter-
national agencies, starting with UNICEF in the mid-
1980s, joined by UNDP and then the World Bank
with its 1990 World Development Report. There is
nothing intrinsically wrong with this: putting
poverty back onto the international organisations'
agenda is an achievement. Nevertheless, by the
mid-1990s we can see that an anti-poverty agenda
that is driven largely by international agencies like
these contains its own internal contradictions. The
following ideas (de Swaan 1988) have been pointed
out elsewhere (Toye and Jackson 1996: 57):
Any international effort, like that of the Bank, to
promote poverty reduction in particular countries
must face up to the implications of one very cen-
tral difficulty It is perhaps not fully appreciated
that the poverty reduction agenda has received
high political priority in the now developed
countries only at particular historical moments
and under well-defined conditions. Research
shows that the attitudes of the elite were crucial.
They took action on the poverty alleviation issue
because they shared a consensus around three
beliefs. They were that: (a) the welfare of the elite
and the welfare of the poor were interdependent,
and the elite was not able to insulate itself from
the living conditions of the poor; (b) the poor did
in fact have the means to affect the welfare of the
elite, principally by three methods, namely crime,
insurrection and epidemic disease; and (c) some
actions by the state would be efficacious in reduc-
ing the threat to the welfare of the elite posed by
the behavior of the poor.
If this historical interpretation is correct, then
the Bank can only make progress by taking on,
with the help of bilateral aid donors, a quasi-
political role. The logic of the situation seems to
dictate that the Bank and the members who sub-
scribe its capital must initiate, and then carry
forward as best they can, a participatory process
aimed at changing elite perceptions in ways that
raise the issue of poverty reduction to ,a much
higher priority in the domestic political agenda.
[TIhe task now is to push the policy dialogue
forward to the point where governments that
have not already done so recognise and inter-
nalise the three propositions (a, b, and c given
above) which should trigger their own active
engagement with the conditions of the poor.
The fact that the anti-poverty agenda is being driven
by these international organisations also results in the
fact that the available diagnosis of the poverty prob-
lem is the diagnosis made by them. Because the inter-
national organisations have the resources to prepare
poverty assessments for numerous poor countries
over a fairly short time-scale and because many of
these countries have not tackled this task for them-
selves, the nature and scope of the poverty problem
tend to get defined externally and in a particular
highly economistic way This definition in turn sets
the parameters for the policies that count as solu-
tions. The situation is not quite as simple as just
stated; the international organisations have in fact
sporadically tried to incorporate into their methods
of poverty description and diagnosis certain more
'bottom-up' anthropological and sociological meth-
ods consisting of an array of information-gathering
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techniques collectively called 'participatory poverty
appraisal'. But the fit among the poverty descriptions,
diagnoses, and prescriptions based on the (interest-
ingly labeled) 'objective' and 'subjective' methods is
frequently imperfect, when the latter are used at all.
The dominant conceptualisation of poverty thus
remains the narrow economistic one of private con-
sumption (or income poverty), albeit now with the
head-count indices for the traditional upper and
lower poverty lines supplemented by the calculation
of the poverty gap and the index of poverty severity
on Foster-Greer-Thorbecke lines (Ravallion 1992,
Blackwood and Lynch 1994). The objectivity' of these
numbers depends on pre-specified standards of nutri-
tion, the identification of discrete 'households', the
reliability of recall in a survey interview, knowledge of
relevant local prices, and so on. The measures are nar-
rowly economistic because they usually exclude even
economic variables like the value of private assets, the
use of common property resources, and the social div-
idend (public spending benefits minus taxes), They
are economistic because they exclude social and polit-
ical aspects of well-being such as leisure, personal
security, cultural goods, social recognition, and polit-
ical rights. All of these excluded variables are con-
stituents of well-being in themselves but are also
resources that vulnerable households and communi-
ties can use to try to cope when confronted by shocks.
The consumption poverty statistics are also highly
aggregative. They can be broken down by region
and the rurallurban split and by household descrip-
tors. But these categories provide only very faint
clues to the dynamics of impoverishment - the
movements of those social groups that are moving
in and out of poverty either temporarily or perma-
nently The descriptions that emerge from such
measurement exercises tend to be banal. Typically,
the majority of people in poor countries turn out to
be poor, although given the data limitations it is dif-
ficult to know whether, say, 52% or 64% is the right
number. Those in rural areas are found to be poorer
than those in urban areas. Certain correlates of
poverty are identified, such as the unemployed,
women, households with a high dependency ratio,
the disabled, the displaced, elderly single people,
and so forth, and these vary from country to coun-
try. None of this can be the slightest surprise to any-
one who has visited a poor country, however briefly
But if the foregoing conceptualisation is the appropri-
ate description of the problem of poverty, then there
really is only one possible solution, namely, the pro-
motion of economic growth. The international anti-
poverty agenda is limited to that of more growth, and
policies aimed at the direct reduction of poverty are
sidelined or totally disappear. Once poverty, mea-
sured 'objectively', has been revealed on such a vast
scale, the anti-poverty agenda must collapse back into
the broad strategy for economic development. The
wheel of the international organisations' anti-poverty
policy turns full circle, and their policy dialogue
becomes the process of persuading countries of the
inevitability of this perception and process.
2 An Alternative Perspective on
the 'Poverty Problem'
Does there exist another way to conceptualise the
'poverty problem' in poor countries? There does
once one breaks away from the universalistic defin-
itions and criteria that are the stock-in-trade of
international organisations in search of indicators of
their own performance. Individual countries, or
provinces within countries, from time to time arrive
at their own formulations of their own particular
poverty problem. Concepts of poverty can be geo-
graphically, historically, and culturally specific.
Such concepts did emerge in countries that in eco-
nomic or material terms were no better off than the
poor countries of today
Take as an example the perceptions of the poverty
problem that led to the development of a national
Poor Law system in England by the early 17th cen-
tury At that time about half of the English popula-
tion was poor in the sense of having no property
beyond a few personal possessions. Economic con-
ditions were deteriorating, and many of the poor
had already become vagrants. State action was
prompted by the following: the idea of society as a
'commonwealth', the parts of which all had to func-
tion cooperatively to produce social order; the elite's
fear of the social and political consequences of an
increase in the number of the vagrant poor; and the
humanist belief that idleness among the poor could
be cured by education and training (Beier 1983,
1-18). Strict punishments for sturdy vagabonds
were combined with state-regulated charity for the
settled poor in both urban and rural areas.
What we see here is a specific state response to a
perceived social and political threat (of rising crime,
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riot, and possibly rebellion) when the ranks of
sturdy beggars, rogues, and vagabonds were
swollen by impoverishment in a pre-industrial soci-
ety Nobody did a poverty assessment first. The pio-
neer estimate of the number and income of vagrants
in England, by Gregory King, relates to the year
1688. The state response was a mixed one, both
punitive and reformative: there was to be harass-
ment, not charity, for the dangerous poor.
The origin of the British welfare state lies in another
time-specific episode, one that produced a quite dif-
ferent conceptualisation of 'the problem of poverty'.
In the late 19th century, the great depression was
perceived as generating a process of urban impover-
ishment. In large cities, especially London, the bot-
tom layers of the respectable working class were
seen as threatened with descent into the ranks of the
criminal and the destitute. The imminent absorption
of part of the proletariat by the lumpen proletariat
was the problem, not poverty in general. This was
why the creation of new categories of universal ben-
efits (old-age pensions, unemployment benefits),
separate from means-tested poor relief, was eventu-
ally adopted as the solution. This time a poverty
assessment was done first, by Charles Booth. But
(unlike Rowntree's later estimate of primary poverty
in York) Booth did not rely in his analysis of life and
labour in London on a simple poverty line approach.
Once again, the state response was selective: the
respectable poor were to be protected, while the
very poor were left to the mercies of the means test,
once Booth's proposal for state labour colonies was
dropped (Himmelfarb 1991, 123-2 8).
The current concern in France, and now in the
European Union, with the problem of social exclu-
sion has taken off from the social selectivity that
remains in European welfare states. Contrasted with
a French cultural and political ideal of social solidar-
ity, the growth in numbers of the long-term unem-
ployed, homeless, deviants, social misfits, and youth
from broken families threatens violent disorder in
poor suburbs, a threat that is expected to grow with
structural economic change and the cutting back of
the welfare state (Rodgers, Gore, and Figueiredo
1995: 1-3). The state response has therefore been to
link targeting of income transfers to schemes of active
reinsertion of beneficiaries into education and train-
ing, jobs, and community projects. But the social-
inclusion agenda in France has its other face: the
heightened fear of immigration and the raising of
barriers to entry into the national territory.
These three examples underline the point made ear-
lier that the way in which 'the poverty problem' is
defined differs according to time (England in the
early 17th and late 19th centuries) and place (mod-
ern France and the United States - for the latter, see
Patterson 1994). 'The poor you have with you
always', but poverty is always problematised differ-
ently Also, the anti-poverty policies that countries
actually adopt depend on the specific way in which
the problem of poverty is defined by the social and
political processes of that place and date. Yet despite
this specificity, there seem to be common conditions
for catalysing state action to reduce (some aspect of)
poverty They are the belief in the social interdepen-
dence of rich and poor; the existence of a credible
threat from the poor, often in terms of increased
social disorder; and the belief that state action can
make a significant difference to the situation.
We must recognise, too, that in the real world, anti-
poverty policies are rarely an expression of pure
humanitarian impulse. They tend to come in a pack-
age with policies like penalties for vagabondage,
state labour colonies, and stricter immigration con-
trols. Indeed, it may be that they become politically
possible because they are packaged like this. This
thought has evidently not occurred to those who are
astonished to find that 'sometimes a punitive piece
of politics is presented as... welfare' or that 'punitive
and coercive forms of social policy [are] frequently
deployed under the mantle of "welfare" (Schaffer
and Lamb 1981: 61; Squires 1990: 1).
3 Alternative Approaches to
Research and Policy
3.1 Elite perceptions of poverty
The alternative perspective emphasises the impor-
tance of national elites and the specific way in
which they formulate 'their' problems of poverty
How do the elites of poor countries perceive the
condition of their poor? Do they believe that there
is, or ought to be, some kind of social compact that
includes the poor? Do they distinguish between the
deserving and the dangerous poor? Do they think
that all or some aspects of poverty do or could con-
stitute a threat to their own well-being? Do they
have confidence that the state could act to defuse
9
any threat? In what measure would that response be
humanitarian and in what measure authoritarian? If
the state lacks the capacity to act, are there other
agencies that could substitute effectively for it?
It is too early to say what results might emerge from
seeking the answers to such questions. But it is
intriguing to speculate on possibilities. A possible
result is to find that elites in poor countries do accept
some notion of a social compact that includes the
poor and do recognise that the poor can mount a
threat to social order, but that at the same time these
same elites have no confidence that the state or any
substitute agency can do anything about poverty If
that were so and if genuine success stories in poverty
alleviation could be identified, this would create an
exciting opportunity By feeding back the success sto-
ries to the representatives of the elites, it might even
prove possible to shift elite perceptions in favour of
pro-poor actions, and not merely to find out what
they are, The cross-fertilisation of ideas and experi-
ences that Kothari referred to could then become
more sharply focused and perhaps more effective.
3.2 Reframing the problem of the poor:
the dynamics of impoverishment
The alternative perspective on the international
anti-poverty agenda has implications for economic,
as well as social and political, research. As we have
seen, the logic of poor countries' situation is that
the consumption poverty of the masses can be sig-
nificantly reduced only by broad-based economic
growth. In saying that, the international organisa-
tions are quite right. But by the same logic, specific
anti-poverty interventions must be designed to
affect particular problems of impoverishment and
to assist particular groups of households and com-
munities that are untouched by economic growth or
even affected adversely by it. The design of anti-
poverty policies is then not helped at all by exer-
cises that measure consumption poverty with the
aid of one or two poverty lines and that at best per-
mit poïnt comparisons of the aggregate percentage
in poverty over an interval of time. The point was
well made by Amartya Sen: 'as a category of causal
analysis, "the poor" is not a very helpful one, since
different groups sharing the same predicament get
there in widely different ways' (1981: 156).
So rather than taking undifferentiated mass poverty
as 'the problem' and looking for optimal solutions
to it, it is necessary to try to reframe the problem.
We need to find a new generative metaphor for anti-
poverty policy (Schon 1993: 137-9). We also need
to stop thinking about poverty in terms of a stock of
poor people, often seen as helpless victims who
need some kind of treatment, and to start thinking
about poverty in terms of flows of people whose
powers of agency are impaired as they become
poorer but can be enhanced sufficiently for them to
escape from poverty We need to know more about
these flows. Some people, of course, are born into
poverty and never escape: the congenitally disabled
and the children of large families whose education
cannot be afforded. Others enter and leave poverty
within their life cycle: youthful unemployment may
be followed by a more prosperous middle life, and
then by the poverty caused by old age, infirmity,
and the loss of relatives. There are other more con-
tingent causes of poverty, like contracting AIDS or
becoming a refugee from civil conflict. Then there
are economic causes - bad husbandry or environ-
mental disasters that lead to the loss of land and
other assets, or technological change that outcom-
petes traditionally made products, or (dare one say
it?) major price shifts that come from the removal of
subsidies in an economic-reform process. There are
so many ways to fall into poverty, and they are very
different. And by the same token, the prospects for
emerging from poverty are also many and different.
3.3 Distinguishing between transitory and
chronic poverty
In order to devise effective anti-poverty policies, it is
therefore necessary to understand better, in particu-
lar countries, the dynamics of impoverishment and
the emergence from poverty What could research do
to make the task easier? A good beginning would be
to do more work on the distinction between those
experiencing transitory poverty and those experienc-
ing chronic poverty Can we learn more about which
types of poor people are transiting and which are
not? Can we show that the characteristics of the for-
mer are fundamentally different from those of the lat-
ter? Or are the 'transitories' merely experiencing the
same degree of fluctuation in their income/consump-
tion as do the 'chronics', but at a higher average level
- that is just above and just below the poverty line?
Some Indian evidence suggests that even over a short
period (three years), three eighths of households
cross the poverty line, in one direction or the other.
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Even in a context of agricultural growth stemming
from technical change, while one fourth of all house-
holds escaped from poverty, a different one eighth
was becoming impoverished (Galba 1993: 43-58).
These figures show a very dynamic situation, in
which growth ïs impoverishing some groups while at
the same time reducing the overall numbers of those
in poverty The same study also suggests that the
chronically poor are not the poorest of the poor but
are distributed through all strata of the poor. The
main characteristics of the chronically poor were lack
of land, little education, and large dependent fami-
lies. At all levels of poverty, some households were
flowing in, while others were flowing out.
3.4 Objectives of anti-poverty policy
From the perspective of a flows model of poverty, the
tasks of anti-poverty policy are to prevent the fall into
poverty of those who are not now poor but who face
risks that make them vulnerable to poverty, to relieve
the poor as far as this is possible, and to avoid forms
of relief that will deter those that could escape from
poverty by their own agency from doing so.
Reconciling these three objectives of prevention,
relief, and avoiding the creation of 'poverty traps' has
proved in practice to be extraordinarily difficult.
Certainly, the recognition of the poor as agents and
not patients reveals noteworthy complications in any
attempt to reduce poverty through strict income-
based targeting of state benefits (Sen 1995: 11-24).
In part these difficulties arise because some deep ethi-
cal dilemmas are involved. It is often taken as an arti-
cle of faith that the best anti-poverty policies are those
that do most to imprové the welfare of the poorest of
the poor. Sen, for example, deplores 'the distorting
effects on policy matters' of the head-count measure of
poverty because 'with (its) use .. the best rewards to
poverty removal policies are almost always obtained
by concentrating on the people who are just below the
poverty line rather than those suffering deep poverty'
(Sen 1981: 157): Sen here takes it as axiomatic that
resources should be concentrated on those whose suf-
fering is greatest. This approach is characteristic of a
rights-based ethics, which has a strong moral appeal,
but not of a utilitarian ethics, which is willing to trade
off increases in the welfare of the poorest and of better-
off groups. One can either treat this as a pure choice of
moral principles, or one can be more pragmatic and
make a practical judgment after investigating what the
trade-offs actually are.
These trade-offs have a time dimension. The prob-
lem cannot be reduced to one of maximising collec-
tive welfare in a single time period. After all, the
most venerable maxim of anti-poverty policy is that
it is good to give a poor man a fish but much better
to teach him how to fish. The superiority of the skill
transfer to the consumption dole arises precisely
because of the multi-period welfare consequences
of the former. Once this investment feature of anti-
poverty policies is recognised, the rule of concen-
trating resources on the poorest of the poor
becomes problematic if it happens that, because of
their lack of assets or skills, they are the least able to
make such investments fructify
Parenthetically, it is hard not to speculate whether, if
this is indeed the case, the perceived lack of realism
of the policy agenda of the international agencies is
not a factor (along with the perceived lack of capac-
ity of national governments) in dissuading elites from
embarking on anti-poverty policies. In countries
where resources for any kind of anti-poverty pro-
grammes are desperately short, recommendations to
allocate them according to a moral principle that is
unfamiliar to the culture and practically not credible
may well undermine the elite's own will to action. On
the field of battle, scarce medical resources should
not be concentrated on the most severely wounded:
there has to be some form of triage. In some respects,
the current international anti-poverty agenda resem-
bles the Charge of the Light Brigade: c'est magnfi que,
mais ce n'est pas la guerre.
3.5 Vulnerability, coping strategies, and
safety nets
If the poor are seen as agents and not as victims, we
need to know more about how they act, what they do
in the different situations of vulnerability and poverty
Presumably, individuals and households faced with
high levels of uncertainty and that know they are vul-
nerable to sudden shocks will develop livelihood
strategies that minimise their risks. In the complex,
diverse, and risk-prone environments that prevail in
many parts of poor countries, it is likely that liveli-
hood strategies will be adopted that will involve the
diversification of sources of income and the accumu-
lation of assets that can be drawn down in an emer-
gency (Davies 1996). When shocks do come they will
be dealt with by a sequence of coping strategies: the
For greater detail on the ICRISAT dataset, see Walker
and Ryan (1990).
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progressive liquidation of assets, the drawing on sup-
port from available social networks, the search for
new local income-earning activities, migration in
search of employment, and ultimately movement to
relief or refugee camps (Longhurst 1994). But if
shocks are quickly repeated, the frequent use of these
coping strategies will have the effect of eroding the
ability to cope (for example, wage earning leading to
the neglect of one's own fields), so that vulnerability is
gradually further increased.
This account raises some interesting research
hypotheses. What is the evidence that livelihood
diversification is a response to covariate risk? Has
the ability of social networks to provide satisfactory
social security been weakened either by the spread
of markets or by the development of alternative
state-sponsored social security systems? Does the
provision of state-sponsored social security have
different effects on coping behaviour according to
its form, whether in terms of guaranteed employ-
ment, cash transfers, or food subsidies?
4 Evaluating Interventions
In the realm of anti-poverty policy, we still need to
do more research on the practical effects of different
types of policy intervention. Building on the work
by Singh and Hazell (1993) with a cross-section of
the ICRISAT dataset,' it should be possible to deter-
mine which types of anti-poverty policies (asset
redistribution, distributionally neutral growth,
employment guarantee schemes, and so on) would
have the greatest impact on different measures of
poverty Such policy simulation experiments could
produce useful policy recommendations.
The choice is not merely among different types of
intervention. Choices need to be made among differ-
ent designs for the same basic type of intervention.
For insurance, an employment guarantee scheme can
have limited coverage with relatively large benefits,
or universal coverage with relatively small benefits.
Evidence suggests that the cost-effectiveness of these
alternative designs is sensitive to the amount of the
total resources available for the scheme. When the
budget is small, the former (limited coverage and
large benefits) is more cost-effective because it will
enable a subset of the poor to escape from poverty
(Gaiha 1993: 127); this finding underlines the point
that when resources are scarce, some form of triage is
likely to be the best policy But such a proposition
needs testing over a wider range of interventions.
The poverty-reducing effects of different schemes of
land reform, different patterns of girls' education,
and different types of credit unions for the poor (the
Grameen Bank) could also be examined.
5 Successes in Poverty Reduction
Policies
Experience from poor countries like Indonesia tells
us that broad-based economic growth can, in the
right conditions, make big inroads on overall
poverty But even with growth, some groups can be
descending into poverty We should be concerned
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